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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
James Darnell Black was sentenced in April 2016 to five years fixed, the maximum, for
one count of criminal possession of a financial transaction card. He appealed, and the Court of
Appeals issued a published decision vacating his sentence and remanding the case to the district
court for preparation of a psychological evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2522 and
resentencing. State v. Black, 2017 Opinion No. 19 (Ct. App. March 2, 2017) (“Opinion”). On
remand, the district court ordered a psychological evaluation which reflects, among other things,
that Mr. Black suffers from mild intellectual disability and has a very low intelligence quotient
(IQ). Mr. Black filed a motion to disqualify the district court judge for cause under Idaho
Criminal Rule 25(b)(4), alleging actual bias. The district court denied the motion, and ultimately
imposed the same sentence on Mr. Black, despite his diagnosed intellectual disability and low
IQ. On appeal, Mr. Black contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to disqualify, and abused its discretion at sentencing. He also contends he was denied due
process of law when the district court relied at sentencing upon information that was materially
false regarding his criminal history.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In December 2014, the Boise Police Department discovered Mr. Black obtained credit
cards or credit card information from multiple people, and used those credit cards or credit card
information to purchase items including Walmart gift cards, an iPad mini, and a Greyhound bus
ticket. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), p.4.)1 Mr. Black was charged by Amended
Information with one count of grand theft by possession of stolen property and five counts of
criminal possession of a financial transaction card. (44191 R., pp.157, 160-62.) The State filed
an Information Part II alleging Mr. Black is a persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho
Code § 19-2514. (44191 R., pp.97-99.)
Mr. Black entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead
guilty to one count of criminal possession of a financial transaction card in exchange for
dismissal of the remaining counts and the State’s agreement not to pursue a persistent violator
enhancement. (2/19/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-13; 44191 R., pp.186-87.) The district court accepted
Mr. Black’s guilty plea. (2/19/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.5-10.) Prior to sentencing, Mr. Black filed a
motion for a psychological evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2522. (44191 R., pp.197201, 204-05.) The district court denied the motion, stating it “ha[d] no reason to believe that the
Defendant’s mental condition will be a significant factor at sentencing.” (44191 R., p.206.) The
case proceeded to sentencing and, on the single count of criminal possession of a financial
transaction card, the district court sentenced Mr. Black to five years fixed—the maximum.
(44191 R., pp.211-13; 4/29/16 Tr., p.52, Ls.23-24.) Mr. Black filed a timely notice of appeal.
(44191 R., pp.214-17, 219-22.)
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The Supreme Court issued an order augmenting this appeal to include the record, transcripts,
and exhibits filed in Mr. Black’s prior appeal, No. 44191. (45316 R., p.2.) The PSI is part of
Mr. Black’s prior appeal.
2

On appeal, Mr. Black challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for a
psychological evaluation, and argued the district court abused its discretion at sentencing.
(44191 Appellant’s Br., pp.5-12.) The Court of Appeals issued a published decision vacating
Mr. Black’s sentence and remanding the case to the district court for preparation of a
psychological evaluation and resentencing. (Opinion, pp.1-7.) The Court held the district court
abused its discretion in denying Mr. Black’s motion for a psychological evaluation because
“there was sufficient reason to believe that Black’s mental condition would be a significant
factor at sentencing.” (Opinion, p.5.) The Court explained:
The facts available were sufficient to alert the sentencing court as to Black’s
longstanding history with mental illness and that mental illness may have been a
factor in the commission of the crime. Thus, there was reason to believe that
Black’s mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing.
(Opinion, p.6.) The Court did not consider Mr. Black’s excessive sentence claim in light of its
decision to vacate his sentence. (Opinion, p.7.)
Before the Opinion was final, the district court contacted appellate counsel stating the
Opinion did not accurately reflect what happened in the case. (See R., p.136.) The district court
prepared a transcript that was not part of the record on appeal, and forwarded that transcript to
appellate counsel.

(See Motion to Aug., Ex. A, pp.1-2, Appx. A.)2

After receiving this

additional transcript, the State filed a motion to correct appellate opinion, asking the Court of
Appeals to file an amended and corrected opinion. (Motion to Aug., Ex. A.) The Court of
Appeals denied the State’s motion, and issued the Remittitur. (Motion to Aug., Ex. B; 45316
R., p.124.)
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The Clerk’s Record does not include copies of the State’s motion to correct appellate opinion
and the order from the Court of Appeals denying that motion. Simultaneously with the filing of
this brief, Mr. Black is filing a Motion to Augment to include copies of these documents in the
Clerk’s Record.
3

On remand, the district court ordered a psychological evaluation of Mr. Black pursuant to
Idaho Code § 19-2522. (45316 R., pp.125-28.) Dr. Sombke, a licensed psychologist, examined
Mr. Black. (Psych. Eval., p.1.)3 He determined Mr. Black has an IQ of 48, and suffers from
severe stimulant use disorder, mild intellectual disability, a personality disorder with antisocial
and paranoid traits, and a depressive disorder. (Psych. Eval., pp.4, 5.)
Mr. Black filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b)(4) to disqualify the
district court judge from presiding over the case, alleging actual bias. (45316 R., pp.130-38.)
The district court denied Mr. Black’s motion, stating it was not biased against Mr. Black.
(5/12/17 Tr., p.32, L.23 – p.33, L.4, 45316 R., pp.143-44.)

Mr. Black filed a motion to

reconsider, and a motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal. (45316 R., pp.145, 15062.) The district court denied both motions. (45316 R., pp.163-65, 169-172.) The Supreme
Court denied the motion for permission to appeal on July 14, 2017. (45316 R., p.174.)
The case proceeded to a second sentencing hearing. The State recommended a unified
sentence of five years, with four years fixed. (7/24/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-7.) Counsel for Mr. Black
recommended time served. (7/24/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-9.) The district court again sentenced
Mr. Black to the maximum term. (7/24/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-4.) The district court said it had
reviewed Mr. Black’s psychological evaluation, and concluded his mental condition “is not a
significant factor at sentencing.” (7/24/17 Tr., p.26, Ls.1-2.) Mr. Black filed a timely notice of
appeal from the judgment of conviction.4 (45316 R., pp.177-80, 193-95.)
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Dr. Sombke’s psychological evaluation was not originally included in this appeal. Mr. Black
filed a Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule on February 1, 2018. The
Supreme Court granted the motion, and Dr. Sombke’s evaluation was submitted to the Court and
the parties on February 6, 2018, at which time the briefing schedule was resumed.
4
Mr. Black filed multiple pro se motions after the notice of appeal was filed, which motions are
not the subject of this appeal. (45316 R., pp.197-219, 228-30.)
4

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Black’s motion pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b)(4) to disqualify the district court judge from presiding over
this case on remand?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Black to five years fixed,
the maximum, considering Mr. Black’s intellectual disability and low IQ?

III.

Was Mr. Black denied due process of law when the district court relied at sentencing
upon information that was materially false regarding his criminal history?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Black’s Motion Pursuant To Idaho
Criminal Rule 25(b)(4) To Disqualify The District Court Judge From Presiding Over This Case
On Remand

A.

Introduction
The Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Black’s sentence and remanded the case to the district

court for preparation of a psychological evaluation, concluding “there was reason to believe that
Black’s mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing.” (Opinion, p.6.) The
Court’s conclusion was directly contrary to the district court’s earlier conclusion that Mr. Black’s
mental condition would not be a significant factor at sentencing. (See Opinion, p.3.) Mr. Black
filed a motion to disqualify the district court judge for cause when the case was remanded,
concerned the judge might be biased or prejudiced against him. The district court denied the
motion, stating it was not concerned about its ability to be fair and impartial, and was not biased
against Mr. Black. (5/12/17 Tr., p.32, L.23 – p.33, L.4.) Unfortunately, the district court’s
imposition of the maximum sentence on Mr. Black, and its explanation for that sentence, reflect
otherwise. The district court was actually biased against Mr. Black, in a way that rendered it
improbable (and, ultimately, impossible) for him to receive a fair and impartial resentencing, and
the district court should have granted Mr. Black’s motion to disqualify for cause.

B.

Standard Of Review
“A district judge’s decision to deny a for cause motion to disqualify pursuant

to I.C.R. 25(b)(4) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Shackelford, 155
Idaho 454, 459 (2013) (citation omitted). “In determining whether the district court abused its
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discretion, the Court asks:

(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as

discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
determination through an exercise of reason.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Did Not Reach Its Determination Through An Exercise Of Reason,
Considering The Nature Of The Court Of Appeals’ Opinion And The District Court’s
Desire To Want To Show, At Resentencing, It Had Made No Mistake In The Original
Proceedings
Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b)(4) provides that “[a]ny party to an action may disqualify a

judge from presiding in any action on [the grounds] . . . that the judge is biased or prejudiced for
or against any party or that party’s case.” Disqualification is necessary under this rule “where
the trial judge has actual bias against the defendant of such nature and character as would render
it improbable that under the circumstances the party could have a fair and impartial [hearing].”
Shackelford, 155 Idaho at 460 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the district
court judge abused her discretion in refusing to disqualify herself from presiding over this case
on remand because, whether the court recognized it or not, it was actually biased against the
defendant in the proceedings on remand, in order to show it had not made a legal error in the
earlier proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized it is very difficult to inquire into
whether a judge is actually biased, in part because the inquiry is such a private matter. See
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) (stating “[t]he judge’s own inquiry
into actual bias . . . is not one that the law can easily superintend or review”). In light of this
limitation, the Supreme Court explained in Caperton the “Due Process Clause has been
implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias.” Id. In inquiring
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into judicial bias under the Due Process Clause, “the Court has asked whether under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is
to be adequately implemented.” Id. at 883-84 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Mr. Black
does not raise the issue of judicial bias under the Due Process Clause in this appeal, as he did not
raise such a challenge below. However, he contends the Supreme Court’s understanding of bias
as framed by an understanding of psychological tendencies and human nature is worth
considering here, in a challenge brought under Rule 25(b)(4).
In the Opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded the district court made a legal error when
it concluded Mr. Black’s mental condition would not be a significant factor at sentencing.
(Opinion, pp.3, 6.) On remand, the district court was understandably motivated to show it had
not erred. The district court said as much at resentencing, when it imposed on Mr. Black the
same sentence it had previously imposed, despite Mr. Black’s diagnosed intellectual disability
and low IQ. The district court said: “The Court did not order [the psychological] evaluation
[originally] because the defense withdrew that request to reconsider that evaluation. And, in the
Court’s view, the evaluation would not be a significant factor at sentencing.” (7/24/17 Tr., p.25,
Ls.14-19.) The district court said it had reviewed Dr. Sombke’s evaluation prior to resentencing
and it “is not a significant factor at sentencing.” (7/24/17 Tr., p.26, Ls.1-2.) “It wasn’t in the
first instance [when the psychological evaluation did not exist]; it isn’t now that I have read it,
combed over it twice.” (7/24/17 Tr., p.26, Ls.2-5.)
Under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human nature, the fact that the
district court presided over Mr. Black’s case on remand posed such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the district court should have granted Mr. Black’s motion to disqualify. If the
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district court had imposed anything less than the maximum sentence at resentencing, it would
have implicitly admitted error in its earlier conclusion that Mr. Black’s mental condition would
not be a significant factor at sentencing. Admitting error is something that is understandably
difficult, especially when the admission takes place publicly, before a defendant who has raised
challenge after challenge to the integrity of the court.5 The district court involved itself in this
case during the pendency of the first appeal, by reaching out to appellate counsel before the
Opinion was final, and preparing a transcript which was not included in the record on appeal.
(See Motion to Aug., Ex. A, pp.1-2, Appx. A.) On remand, it would certainly appear the district
court was actually biased against Mr. Black’s argument that his mental condition was a
significant factor at sentencing.
Though this Court is no doubt reticent to review the district court’s decision that it was
not actually biased against Mr. Black, Mr. Black respectfully requests that this Court consider
that decision in light of the unique facts of this case. The district court disagreed with the Court
of Appeals’ conclusion that it had erred. The only way for the district court to prove it had not
erred was to impose the same sentence on Mr. Black the second time around, regardless of what
the psychological evaluation showed. The district court did not reach its decision to deny
Mr. Black’s Rule 25(b)(4) motion through an exercise of reason. This is the rare case where the
district court should have granted a motion to disqualify for cause, and its decision to the
contrary was an abuse of discretion.

5

Mr. Black filed a judicial complaint against the district court judge and a petition with the Idaho
Supreme Court for writ of prohibition. (5/12/17 Tr., p.7, L.25 – p.8, L.9.)
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Black To Five Years Fixed,
The Maximum, Considering Mr. Black’s Intellectual Disability And Low IQ

A.

Introduction
In imposing the maximum sentence on Mr. Black, the district court did not treat

Mr. Black’s intellectual disability and low IQ as mitigating. The district court explained to
Mr. Black, “[i]n my view, recognizing that you have mild mental retardation . . . it is not a
question of if you commit a new crime, but when you commit a new crime.” (7/24/17 Tr., p.27,
Ls.4-7 (emphasis added).) The district court abused its discretion in failing to appropriately
consider and weigh Mr. Black’s mental condition. In light of the nature of Mr. Black’s offense,
his character, and the protection of the public interest, the sentence imposed by the district court
was not reasonable and was an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where the sentence imposed by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant

bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151
Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)). “When a trial
court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is
reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)). “A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation
omitted).

“When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an

independent examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the offense, the character
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of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Failing To Appropriately Consider And
Weigh Mr. Black’s Mental Condition At Sentencing And The Sentence It Imposed Was
Not Reasonable
The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the district court for preparation of a

psychological evaluation, concluding “there was sufficient reason to believe that Black’s mental
condition would be a significant factor at sentencing.” (Opinion, p.5.) Dr. Sombke evaluated
Mr. Black, and determined he has an IQ of 48, placing him in the 0.1 percentile range (meaning
that, in a random sample of 1000 people of his age, he would have scored better than less than
one of them). (Psych. Eval., p.4.) Dr. Sombke diagnosed Mr. Black with severe stimulant use
disorder, mild intellectual disability, a personality disorder with antisocial and paranoid traits,
and a depressive disorder. (Psych. Eval., p.5.) Dr. Sombke noted treatment was available for all
of these conditions apart from Mr. Black’s intellectual disability, which is “chronic and lifelong.”
(Psych. Eval., p.6.) Mr. Black’s mental limitations are significant, and should have been a
significant factor at sentencing.
The district court reviewed Dr. Sombke’s psychological evaluation, and concluded
Mr. Black’s mental condition was not a significant factor at sentencing. The district court told
Mr. Black, “In my view, recognizing that you have mild mental retardation, as Dr. Sombke has
outlined, it is not a question of if you commit a new crime, but when you commit a new crime.”
(7/24/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.4-7 (emphasis added.)) The district court did not adequately consider and
give mitigating weight to Mr. Black’s mental condition. See State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 461
(2002) (“The defendant’s mental condition is . . . one of the factors that must be considered and
weighed by the court at sentencing.”). Mr. Black’s mental condition might mean he is more
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likely to commit another crime, but it is also mitigating, as it reduces his criminal culpability.
See State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 439 (1991) (recognizing “a mental defect may diminish an
individual’s culpability for a criminal act”); State v. King, 120 Idaho 955, 959 (Ct. App. 1991)
(“Diminished capacity to act rationally is relevant to the determination of sentence; however, it
does not excuse the crime.”).
Mr. Black suffers from an intellectual disability, which is also known as mental
retardation. See Mahler v. State, 157 Idaho 212, 213 n.1 (Ct. App. 2014) (following the practice
of the United States Supreme Court as treating the term “intellectual disability” as fully
coextensive with “mental retardation”). The United States Supreme Court has described the
characteristics of this condition as follows:
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18.
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and
wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however,
by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand
the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage
in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often act
on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings
they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an
exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal
culpability.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (footnotes omitted). Mr. Black’s intellectual
disability should have been a significant factor at sentencing because it diminished his personal
culpability. Mr. Black has deficits relating to impulse control and has a reduced ability to
abstract and learn from his mistakes. Even though Mr. Black’s mental condition is not directly
related to the offense of criminal possession of a financial transaction card, it was relevant for
purposes of mitigation, and was not appropriately considered by the district court. See State v.
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Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008) (explaining “mental health evidence is relevant to
mitigation even where there is not [a nexus between the defendant’s mental health and the crimes
he committed]”). Counsel for Mr. Black asked the district court to look at Mr. Black’s criminal
history in the context of his mental health and substance abuse issues, but the district court failed
to do so. (7/24/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.9-23.)
Mr. Black does not contend that a person with an intellectual disability and low IQ can
never receive the maximum sentence, but he does contend that, for such a sentence to withstand
appellate review, it would have to be justified by the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the need to protect the public interest. None of these factors justify the imposition
of the maximum term of imprisonment on Mr. Black. Looking first at the nature of Mr. Black’s
offense, it did not warrant the maximum sentence. Mr. Black pled guilty to criminal possession
of a financial transaction card, a non-violent offense, and admitted using credit card information
he fraudulently obtained to purchase a Greyhound bus ticket for $261.60. (44191 R., pp.211-12.)
He was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $934, representing the economic loss suffered
as a result of the offense for which he pled guilty and the offenses which were dismissed by the
State as part of the plea agreement. (44191 R., pp.211-12.) Using wrongfully obtained credit
card information to make purchases totaling less than $1,000 is generally not a crime that should
result in five years’ imprisonment.
Looking next at Mr. Black’s character, he is not the type of person who is deserving of a
maximum sentence. Mr. Black was 49 years old when he committed the offense at issue, and
had been addicted to crack cocaine for over 20 years. (PSI, pp.3, 22, 26; Psych. Eval., p.3.) He
has lived most of his adult life with his mother, and has an extremely limited employment
history. (PSI, pp.18-20.) At the time of his psychological evaluation, he could not recall when
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he last worked full time. (Psych. Eval., p.2.) Mr. Black apologized for his conduct at sentencing
saying, “I expressed to you [at the original sentencing] how sorry I was for my actions. And I
guess, as I sit here today, I’m still sorry. That doesn’t change. I knew what I did was wrong. I
knew that in my heart.” (7/24/17 Tr., p.14, Ls.12-17.) At the time of resentencing, Mr. Black
had been incarcerated for 30 months without any problems. (7/24/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-9.) He had
been studying religion while incarcerated and had been attending Narcotics Anonymous classes.
(7/24/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.6-12.) Mr. Black is a person deserving of some sympathy, and clearly in
need of substance abuse and mental health treatment, not the maximum term of incarceration.
Looking finally at the protection of the public interest, the maximum sentence was not
necessary to protect the public interest from the risk posed by Mr. Black. Mr. Black has a
lengthy criminal history, but has never committed a crime of violence. (PSI, pp.6-16.) The
presentence investigator concluded Mr. Black might pose a risk to the community, but it would
be a risk of non-violent crimes. (PSI, p.26.) Dr. Sombke noted Mr. Black “does not appear to be
particularly violent” and concluded “[i]f Mr. Black is able to get his drug addiction under control
and remain drug free, his risk to the community can be significantly reduced.” (Psych. Eval.,
p.8.) Mr. Black faces charges in Oregon, where he will likely be transferred when he is released.
(7/24/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-9, p.12, Ls.1-3; PSI, pp.26, 29-30, 148-56; 4/29/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.23-25.)
Recognizing this fact, and considering that Mr. Black’s criminal conduct appears to be largely
driven by his substance abuse, the district court should have imposed something less than the
maximum sentence. The district court exceeded the sentencing recommendations from both
parties, and failed to treat Mr. Black’s mental condition as mitigating in any way. Simply put,
the district court abused its discretion at sentencing.
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III.
Mr. Black Was Denied Due Process Of Law When The District Court Relied At Sentencing
Upon Information That Was Materially False Regarding His Criminal History

A.

Introduction
At resentencing, the district court told Mr. Black it “[could not] recall seeing an

individual who has a more extensive criminal history than you” and said Mr. Black’s criminal
history “spans three decades and most of the states.” (7/24/17 Tr., p.26, L.20 – p.27, L.1.) This
was materially false. The record reflects that Mr. Black has been charged with offenses in 11
states, which is far from a majority. (PSI, pp.6-16.) The district court denied Mr. Black his
constitutional right to due process of law when it relied on this materially false information at
sentencing, and this error was not harmless, as Mr. Black’s sentence could well have been
different if the district court had considered his actual criminal history, which the district court
said was the most important factor influencing the court’s sentencing decision.

B.

Standard Of Review
Mr. Black did not argue in the district court that his sentence violated his constitutional

right to due process. To succeed on this claim on appeal, he thus has to demonstrate the district
court committed fundamental error. An error constitutes fundamental error where it: “(1)
violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
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C.

The District Court Committed Fundamental Error When It Relied At Sentencing Upon
Information That Was Materially False Regarding Mr. Black’s Criminal History
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a fair

trial in criminal proceedings. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1. Our courts have recognized
that “a judge may consider a broad range of information when fashioning an appropriate
sentence” but “a defendant’s right to due process is abridged when the sentencing judge relies
upon information that is materially untrue or when the judge makes materially false assumptions
of fact.” State v. Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040, 1042-43 (Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted).
Here, the district court relied at sentencing upon materially false information regarding
Mr. Black’s criminal history. The district court said, “I have seen individuals come before me
who have committed more violent crimes. I have seen individuals come before me who have
committed more egregious crimes. But I cannot recall seeing an individual who has a more
extensive criminal history than you. It spans three decades and most of the states.” (7/24/17
Tr., p.26, L.20 – p.27, L.1.) Mr. Black’s criminal history is lengthy, but it does not span “most
of the states.” Mr. Black has been charged with offenses in 11 states (Ohio, Kentucky, Florida,
Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Idaho, Colorado, Oregon, and Michigan). (PSI, pp.616.) The presentence investigator described Mr. Black’s criminal history as involving “multiple
states.” (PSI, p.16.) Eleven out of fifty is simply not most.
While the distinction between “multiple” and “most” may seem minor, on the facts of
this case, it is not. After falsely describing Mr. Black’s criminal history, the district court said, “I
am imposing the maximum sentence permitted by law for the purpose of protecting society.”
(7/24/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-4.) The sentence needed to protect society could have been different if it
was based on Mr. Black’s actual criminal history, instead of false information about that history.
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In State v. Gawron, 124 Idaho 625 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals concluded the
sentencing judge’s mistaken belief that the defendant had seven prior felony convictions instead
of six was not a materially false assumption of fact because it was not material to the judge’s
sentencing decision. See id. at 627-28. The Court explained:
Gawron has failed to show that the sentence or reconsideration motion probably
would have turned out differently had the district court realized there were six
prior felonies instead of seven. Our independent review of the record reveals
nothing that would indicate the district court’s belief that seven prior felonies
existed instead of six had any material [effect] on either the sentence or the
subsequent motion to reconsider.
Id. at 628. The Court thus concluded there was no violation of the defendant’s due process
rights. See id. This Court should reach the opposite conclusion here.
As discussed above, the nature of Mr. Black’s offense and his character did not warrant
the maximum term of incarceration. The district court imposed the maximum sentence because
it believed it was necessary “for the purpose of protecting society.” (7/24/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.2-4.)
In considering the protection of society, the difference between Mr. Black’s actual criminal
history (spanning multiple states) and the district court’s description of that history (spanning
most of the states) was material. The district court denied Mr. Black due process of law when it
relied on this materially false information at sentencing, and this error was not harmless. The
error plainly exists in the record, and trial counsel’s failure to object could not have been a
tactical decision, as it could only have resulted in a lesser sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Black requests that this Court vacate his sentence and, instead of remanding for a
third sentencing, reduce Mr. Black’s sentence to three years fixed, considering the time he has
already been incarcerated and the fact that he has charges pending in Oregon. Alternatively,
Mr. Black request that this case be remanded to the district court for a third sentencing hearing
before a different district court judge, to be conducted on an expedited basis.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2018.
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